Last updated on October 1, 2025
What obligates us to act morally? For centuries, philosophers have struggled with this question. Some point to religion, others to cultural traditions or utilitarian calculations. But as Kant argued, the deepest source of moral authority lies in our very capacity as rational agents. To be human is to reason, and to reason is to confront questions of what we ought to do.
Philosopher Niko Vriend has described this as agency’s “global jurisdiction.” Every ordinary activity requires reflection on our motives and choices. Even pausing to question the authority of reason is itself an act of reasoning. There is no stepping outside of agency; it is fundamentally inescapable. From this view, practical reason itself becomes the ultimate authority for action. Ethical frameworks that depend on anything else like divinity may advise, but they cannot truly obligate.
This is where Kant’s categorical imperative come into play. Kant finds that an action is moral only if it can be universalized. This means that it’s moral if it could be made a law binding on all rational beings without contradiction. A maxim that is self-defeating fails this test. For example, if everyone were allowed to steal, the idea of personal property would no longer exist. But stealing only makes sense if property exists. So the rule “it is permissible to steal” contradicts itself when applied universally. By contrast, principles that survive universalization carry genuine moral weight.
Having established this, let’s consider putting it to use in the context of the International Criminal Court. Established by the Rome Statute in 1998, the ICC is the first permanent tribunal with jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide. It embodies a Kantian vision: a cosmopolitan institution that enforces universal principles of justice, not as expressions of national interest but as obligations binding on all.
The ICC’s coercive authority carries moral legitimacy because it protects basic human freedoms. The Statute does not simply reflect the will of powerful states, it codifies crimes that offend humanity itself. Philosopher Michael Ralph has gone further, describing the ICC as a form of “global criminal consciousness,” reinforcing the idea that humanity has a shared interest in punishing atrocities that threaten the cohesion of world society.
For Kant, justice requires institutions that reflect universal moral law rather than local customs or interests. The ICC, in this sense, can be seen as the practical realization of his philosophy. It criminalizes acts — genocide, torture, aggression — that no rational agent could will as universal principles. It also provides a venue independent of state control, ensuring that accountability does not depend on the whims of national politics.
The United States remains outside the Rome Statute, citing concerns about sovereignty and potential prosecutions of its own citizens. Yet the moral question remains. If obligation arises from reason itself, and if universal justice demands accountability for crimes against humanity, then refusing to participate undermines the very principles the U.S. claims to defend.
The language of “should” matters here. To say that the U.S. should join the ICC is to express not preference but obligation. If morality is grounded in agency and consistency with universal law, then accession to the Rome Statute is not just prudent diplomacy. It is a duty.
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